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ABSTRACT
This paper examines empirically the effect of unfunded pension
obligations on corporate share prices and discusses the implicationsof these
estimates for national saving, the decline of the stock market in recent years,
and the rationality of corporate financial behavior. The analysis uses the
information on inflation—adjusted income and assets that large firms were
required to provide for 1976 and subsequent years.
The evidence for a sample of nearly 200 manufacturing firms is
consistent with the conclusion that share prices fully reflect the valueof
unfunded pension obligations. Since the conventional accounting measureof
the unfunded pension liability has a number of problems (which weexamine in
the paper), it would be more accurate to say that the data are consistentwith
the conclusion that shareholders accept the conventional measure asthe best
available information and reduce share prices by a corresponding amount.
The most important implication of the share price response is that
the existence of unfunded private pension liabilities does not necessarily
entail a reduction in total private saving. Because the pension liability
reduces the equity value of the firm, shareholders are given notice ofits
existence and an incentive to save more themselves. For this reason,unfunded
private pensions differ fundamentally from the unfundedSocial Security pension
and the other unfunded federal government civilian and military pensions.
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Pensions have become a major factor in the process of capital formation.
Pension assets at the end of 1919 exceeded $5140billion.1 The increase in pri-
vate pension coverage and the funding requirements imposed by thel9T4 Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) imply that pension assets are likely to
continue to represent a growing share of national wealth. There is, however,
substantial uncertainty and debate about the future role of private pensions and
their relation to the Social Security program.2An understanding of the impact
of private pensions on aggregate saving is therefore potentially very
important.3
*HarvardUniversity and the National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper
is part of the NBER Study of the Changing Role of Debt and Equity and of' the
Bureau's research on private and public pensions. We are grateful for com-
ments on earlier versions presented at the 1918 NBER Summer Institute and at
subsequent program meetings. We also want to thank Fisher Black, Jeremy Bulow,
Benjamin Friedman, Stewart Myers and Irwin Tepper for helpfuldiscussions and
James Poterba for assistance with the research. The NBER and the National
Science Foundation provided financial support. The views expressed here are
our own and should not be attributed to the NBER or Harvard University.
1 This includes private pension funds, pension reserves of life insurance
companies, and state and local government employee retirement funds.The
data are presented in Federal Reserve Board (1980).
2 See, for example, the Preliminary Report of' the President's Commission on
Pension Policy (1980), Greenough and King (1976), and Ehrbar (1917).
3 For a general discussion of the relation between private pensions and
aggregate saving, see Feldstein (1978).—2—
The present paper examines oneaspect of the relation between
private pensions and aggregate saving: thesignificance of unfunded corporate
pensions. As we explain below, the impact ofprivate pensions on aggregate
saving depend on the extent to whichpension promises remain unfunded and
unambiguouslydoes depend on the extent to which shareprices reflect this form
of corporate liability.1 The shareprice response also has implications for
corporate financial policyand for understanding the poor performance ofthe
stockmarket in recent years.
Thetypical pension plan is a corporate promise topay retirement
benefits based on the retiree's number ofyears of employment and his level
of earnings during his immediate preretirement years.2Although an employee
generally forfeits any claim to benefits if he leaves thecompany after only
a few years of employment, the benefits of anemployee who stays with the
firm for some minimum number ofyears become "vested", i.e., the employee is
entitled to benefits even if he subsequently leavesthe company before retire-
ment age.3 Firms can set aside tax—deductible fundsto meet these vested
1 The relationbetween unfunded pension liabilities andaggregate savings is discussed in Feldstein (1978) but noempirical investigation of this
particular issue is presented there.
2 Thistype of pension is called a "defined benefit plan". Incontrast, a "definedcontribution plan" is acorporatepromise to contribute some amount eachyear on behalf of current employees; retirees then receivean annuity
based on the accumulated value of these contributions.McGill (1975) is a
standard reference on private pensions.Trowbridge and Farr (1976) and
Treynor (1977) focus on pension funding.
3 Since 197k, theERISA rules mandate that all private pensionsprovide
vesting of any employee who nets certain conditions ofage and/or years of service.—3—
future benefit obligations and the income on these assets is not taxed to
either the corporation or the pension plan itself.
Some firms fund all of their vested pension obligation, but many-
do not.1 The unfunded pension benefits are similar in many- ways to outstanding
corporate bonds. But unlike corporate bonds, the unfunded pension benefits
are not recorded in the corporate balance sheets.2 Official accounting rules
only require firms to indicate the extent of their unfunded vested pensions
inthe notesthat accompany the balance sheet; although this information must
beprovided in the annual 10—K report to the Securities andExchange
Commission, there is no requirement to include it in the firmts annual report to
shareholders.
The economic effects of unfunded pension obligations depend critically
on the ability of the stock market to pierce this accounting veil. To see why
theshare price response is particularly important as a determinant of the
effect of pensions or aggregate saving, itisuseful to consider first the
simple quesion of what would happen if a fully-funded private pension plan
replaced an equalamountof saving that employees would otherwise have done for
their own retirement. Such a pension would obviously have no effect on aggre-
gate saving; the additional corporate saving in the pension plan would just off-
set the reduced saving by employees. More generally, a fully—funded private
1 The ERISA rulesrequire that firmsfollow a policy of fundingallnew
pensionobligations within 30 years and all previous pension obligations
within 4Oyears. The reasons that firms donot fund are discussed briefly
inSection 6 of this paper.
2 There are also important tax differences between bonds and unfunded pensions
which will be described below.—Ii—
pension would increase national saving if pension benefits exceed theamount
that individuals would otherwise provide for theirown retirement. Conversely,
if benefits merely replace individual saving,a less than fully funded pension
could actually depress total saving.
To see how an unfunded pension could reduce nationalsaving, consider
thefollowing case: Employees accept a promise of future pension benefits in
exchange for a current wage reduction (or smaller wageincreasethantheywould
otherwise obtain).The employees recognize that this is Just a change in the
timing of their lifetime income with no change in its present value;they there-
fore do not change theircurrent orfuture consumption but reduce their current
saving by the reduction in their current wage. If this substitution ofpromised
benefits for current wages is not funded, accountingprofits rise. If share-
holders do not recognize the future obligation, they willincorrectly interpret
therise in current income as an increase in permanent income and willraise
their ownconsumption. The combined consumption of shareholders and employees
thusrises and nationalsaving falls.
Thisexample makes it clear that the extent of funding matters only if
shareholders do not change their own saving to offsetany underfunding by the
firms. An unfunded private pension will not differ froma funded one if the
firm's shareholders recognize that the extra accountingprofits that result from
substituting an unfunded pension for higher wages are just balanced by thepen-
sion benefits that must be paid in the future.1 If the shareprice is reduced
This assumes that employees correctly substitute betweenwages and pension
promises; see Feldstein (1978) for a more precise statement of the
conditions.—5—
bythe extent of the unfundedpensionobligation, the shareholders will have
both the correct information and the correct incentive to increase their saving
by the increase in the unfunded pension liability.1
This paper examines empirically the effect of unfunded pension
obligations on corporate share prices and discusses the implication of these
estimates for national saving, the relative decline of the stock market in
recent years, and the rationality of corporate financial behavior. The analysis
usesthe information on inflation—adjusted income and assets that large firms
were required to provide for 19T6 and subsequent years. Although there are
still many problems with these data, they represent a significant improvement
over previous conventional accounts.
The evidence for asample of nearly 200firms is consistent with the
conclusion that share prices fully reflect the value of unfunded pension
obligations. Since the conventional accounting measure of the unfunded pension
liability has a number of problems, it would be more accurate to say that the
dataare consistent with the conclusion that shareholders accept the
conventional measure as the best available information and reduce share prices
by a corresponding amount. Although the standard errors are large enough to
admit a more powerful effect on share prices, the hypothesis that unfunded
liabilities do not reduce the corporation's market value can be unambiguously
rejected by conventional criteria.
Some of the unfunded "shareholder" saving maytakethe form of corporate
retainedearnings.—6—
Section 1 discusses the theory of pension liability evaluation from
the point of view of the shareholder, i.e., the expected impact of unfunded
vested pensions on share prices. The second section develops the specification
of market value equations while section three describes the data and sample.
The fourth and fifth section present the results of the statistical analysis.
There is a brief concluding section that comments on the implications of this
research.
1. The Theory of Pension Liability Valuation
Consider a firm that incurs a new obligation to payftturepension
benefits. What effect should that have now on the equity value of the firm?
Calculating the correct answer depends on dealing appropriately with five issues:
Cl) the tax deductibility of pension expenses; (2) the discount rate used for
combining benefits at different dates; (3) the distinction between vested and
unvested benefits; (14) the impact of inflation; and (5) the uncertainty of
benefits and asset yields. This section discusses the correct treatment of
each of these issues and the type of bias that is introduced by the conventional
measure.
The tax deductibility of pension payments by the firm implies that
every dollar of contribution reduces the equity value of the firm by only
$(1—ta)where tc is the marginal tax rate on corporate profits.1 Since t
1 This implicitly assumes that, an extra dollar of retained earnings raises the
the firm's value by one dollar. Auerbach (1919), Bradford (1979) and King
(1971) discuss conditions under which the tax on dividend income implies that
the share value should rise less than one dollar per dollar of retained
earnings. Feldstein and Green (1979) generalize their argument and show that
the value could be more or less than dollar for dollar. Allofthe calcula-
tionsin the present paper can therefore be regarded as indicating the change
in equity value up to a multiple equal to the marginal valuation of equity.—7—
isthe combined federal and state marginal tax rate, a one dollar benefit that
is paid out of current corporate income reduces the firm's equity by about 50
cents.A one dollar contribution to the pension fund to meet future benefit
obligations also reduces the firm's tax by about 50 cents and therefore only
reduces equity earnings by about 50 cents. It is wrong therefore to regard
pension liabilities as exactly equivalent to bonds or loan balances; indeed,
it may be more accurate to treat each dollar of ordinary debt obligation as
equivalent to two dollars of pension obligation.
The tax deductibility of pension contributions is logically different
from the nontaxability of the earnings of pension fund assets. The fact that
these earnings are not taxed has important implications for calculating the
present value of future benefit obligations. In general, the present value
of future benefit obligations cannot be calculated by discounting benefits
at either the pretax or aftertax rate of return but depends on the extent
(or speed) these benefit obligations are funded. Let i be the nominal
rateof interest that the firm earns on assets in its pension fund and that
the firm pays on its outstanding debt.1 The net cost of funds to the firm is
(ltc)iand this is the rate that it should use to calculate the present value
of its future net pension contributions. But once a dollar has been contributed,
it accumulates at rate i inside the pension fund. A benefit in year T
of BENT can be financed by a contribution in year t of CONt =C].+1)t_TBENT.
The present value of that contribution is V [1 +(i_t)iJtCONt. Thus the
present value of the benefit obligation is V =[1+(l_tc)iJ_t(1+)t_T BENT and
1 Theargument here assumes that the firm's marginal source of finance is debt
and that the pension fund also invests only in debt. A more general rule
withdebt and equity is stated below.—8—
theimpact on the equity- value of this benefit obligation and funding schedule
is(i—ta) V =(i—ta)[1 +(1—t)i]—t (i+i)t—T BENT. More generally, if equity
aswell as debt is used in both corporate finance and pension fund investment,
the impact on the equity value is (1_tc)V= (ltc) [(1 +r)t(l+r) t—T BENT)]
wherer is the gross pretax return that the pension fund earns and rn is the
firm's net cost of marginal funds.
Thetwo specialcases of complete fundingand no funding (pay—as—you—
go finance) can help to clarify the application of this principle.If the firm
chooses to fund its new obligation immediately, a contribution of BENT(i+i)T
issufficient. Since the fund earns a return of i and paysnotax on its
income, this contribution will grow to exactly BEN at the end of T years.At
the moment before the contribution is made, the unfunded liability is thus
BEN (i÷i)T. Because the contribution is tax deductible, the net impact
of this obligation on the equity value of the firm is (l—tc) BEN(l+i)T. In
contrast, if the firm does no funding, it must payBENdollars at time T for
a net cost to the shareholders of (l_tc)BEN• Like other certain costs,this
must be discounted at the firm's net interest rate to give a present value
of (l—tc) BEN11+(1_tc)il_T.l
Since the calculation shows thatthecost of the pay—as—you—go
method hasahigher present value than the cost of the immediate funding method,
It is useful to consider the analogy between pension costs and future bond
interest. Assume that the firm hasacurrent debt of D which it plans
never to repay but continually to rollover at interest rate i.The annual
interest payments are iD and their net of tax costs are (1_tc)iD• The present
value of these costs, discounting at the net—of—tax interest rate (1tc)i is
then just (l_tc)iD/(ltc)i D, as it should be. Similarly, if the firm plans
to repay the debt at the end of one year, the net cost will be D +(1_tc)iD
and the present value is [D+(l_tc)iD1/[l+(l_tc)]D The key difference be-
tween the debt andthepension obligation is thattheprincipal repayment of
debt is not tax deductible.—9—
itis optimal for the firm to fund its pension as soon as possible. The fact
that firms do not fund their pension obligations fully may reflect constraints',
errors, or nonconstant borrowing costs. Whatever the reason, theeffect of
future benefit obligations on the firm's equity value should reflect the timing
of the contributions and the difference between the untaxed yield earned on the
portfolio and the firm's net of tax cost of funds.2
In practice, firms calculate the present value of their vested pensions
by discounting the future actuarially—expected vested benefit obligations by an
estimate of the yield that they will obtain on their pension portfolio.3 The
value of the unfunded vested pension obligation is then calculated by
subtracting the value of their pension assets from this measure of the pension
obligation. For the funded portion of the benefits, this is an appropriate
comparison; the discount rate is conceptually correct, and there is no need to
adjust the funded benefits for their tax deductibility since no further tax
deduction will be allowed. But for the unfunded benefits, the usual method
of calculationoverstates the true value. To see this,note that theusual
method ofevaluation defines the firm's liablity as:
1The tax law limits the speed with which unfunded benefit obligations can be
funded.
2 If firms do not fund fully because additional funding raises the cost of
borrowing, the net marginal cost of funds may equalthereturn on the
pensionportfolio; i.e., in the notation used above, r =r.In that special
case,a marginal change in the timing of funding is irrelevant. The effect
of borrowing on the cost of funds can be decisive only if the market does not
regard unfunded liabilities as equivalent to ordinary debt, e.g., becauseof
senioritydifferences or the ERISArules.
3 In many cases, this is not even a realistic estimate but only a conventional
assumption designed to be conservative.—10—
T
(1) L1 = BEN+
t=i (i+i)t
If these benefits were funded immediately, the correct value of the liability
would be
T
(2) L2 =(1_tc) BENt
t=ifl1)t
since the contribution would be tax deductible and the pension portfolio would
earn i.1- Since L2 is less than L1, the usual method overstates the true value
of the obligations that are about to be vested. However, if the benefits would




Comparing L3 and L1 shows that their relative value depends in general on the
interest rate and tax rate and on the time pattern of the benefits. Thus if
BENt is a constant perpetuity, L1 =L3.If T is finite and BENT is constant,
>L3.But if benefits grow sufficiently fast, the higher rate of discount in
L1 Outweighs the multiplicative (ltc) factor in and L1 <L3.The usual
method of discounting may therefore understate or overstate the correct value of
the vested pension obligations.
Moreover, in thinking about future benefit obligations it is important
to distinguish between vested benefits and actuarially expected benefits. The
narrow focus on vested benefits may understate the true value of the firm's
Notethat L2is equivalent to the amount of debt that the firm would have to
use in order to fund the entire future benefit obligation.
2 Note thatL3 is equivalent to the amount of debt the servicing of which would
be equivalent to the cost of meeting the pension obligation on a concurrent
(pay—as—you—go) basis.—11—
obligations. Accounting reports focus on the vested benefits because a future
pension benefit does not become a legal liability of a firm until it is vested,
i.e., until the worker is entitled to the benefit even if he quits the firm or
is fired. A typical plan might provide that an employee with 10 years or uxre
of employment has vested benefits of two percent of his final year's earnings
per year of service; e.g., a 20—year employee gets percent of his final
year's earnings. In this case, the vested pension obligation completely ignores
theemployee with 9years of service even though he is very likely to stay long
enoughto become vested.Similarly, the vested benefits of the 61 yearold
employee with 20 years of service make no allowance for the fact that he is very
likely to waituntilhe is 65beforeretiring. The calculation of vested bene-
fitsisintentionally myopic. Should itbe?
The purpose of evaluating pension liabilities is to assess the firm's
future expenses in excess of the value of the services thatit willreceive
for those payments. The vested benefits of aretired worker is the clearest
caseto consider. Since theworker is already retired, he will provide no
further services; the present actuarial value of his pension rights is a
net liability of the firm. Consider next the 614 year old worker with 20 years
of experience who will get 140 percent of his terminal wage if he retires at
age 614 and 142 percent if he waits another year. Bulow (19T9) has pointed out
that the employee's opportunity to obtain higher benefits by working an extra
year is irrelevant if the firm and the worker take this into account in setting
thewage for work until age65. Morespecifically, ifthewageisset so that
thewage plus the increased value of pension benefits equals the marginal
value product of labor, there is no excess cost to the firm asociated with the
employee'spostponed retirement. Thesame argument applies to the individual—12—
whohas had 9yearsof service with the firm andisjust about to become
vested. Ifhis wage during his tenth year of employment is set so that
the sum of the wage and the initial value of the vested pension are equal to the
marginal value product of his labor, there is no excess compensation in the
prospective benefits.
Although Bulow's analysis is logically sound, it is not clear how
relevant it is in practice. I know of no empirical evidence that wages are
adjusted to offset unusually large accruals of vested benefits in particular
years or during the years just before retirement. Union contracts make no
provisions for such changes and "age discrimination" laws probably may make
doing so illegal. Since the required adjustment amounts are quite large, such
changes would be easily detected if they actually existed. Consider, for
example, a 39 year old worker with 9 years of experience. If he stays with the
firm for exactly one extra year, he will have a vested right to a pension at age
65 equal to O.20E where E is his earnings during his tenth year of
employment. With a discount rate of 6 percent, a life annuity of $1 per year
beginning at age 65 has an actuarial present value of $9.67.l An annuity of
O.20E therefore has an actuarial present value of 1.9E. Discounting this back
from age 65 to age LLO implies that the value in the tenth year of employment
of the newly vested rights is (1.06)25 (l.9E)O.1451E. Thus the marginal
value product of the worker must be 15 percent higher than the wage in the tenth
1 This value is based on the latest 1971 Individual Annuity Table with
Projection Scale B. The projection scale B refers to an adjustment made
to basic data to reflect future mortality differences. The annuity tables
appear in Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, 1972, Vol. 23, p. 527.—13—
year even though the two are equal in the ninth year. It is obviously not true
thatwages (orwage growth) falls by so much or that worker productivity rises
by so much.1
A similar calculation for the worker at age 6h with 20 years of
experience also indicates an implausible compensating wageadjustment.If
is the earnings on which benefits would be based if the individual
retired at age 6!, the value of the pension is (1.06)—i [9.67 (.h0)E6j41 =
3.65E6.2 At age 65, this pension is worth 1.o6(3.65)E6 =3.87E6j.Waiting
an additional year to retire raises the value of the pension to 9.67(.h2)E65 =
1.o6E65.Even if E5 =E6,this would imply a 5 percent increase in produc-
tivity between ages 614 and 65. Alternatively, with productivity constant, the
wage must fall by about 5 percent. In practice, wages of older workers do not
fall in this way while supervisor's evaluations indicate that their productivity
is actually declining.3
1 By comparison, between the tenthand eleventh rear, the value of the vested
benefit increases from .1451(1.06)E to (1.06)—2 [9.67(.22) E (i +g)1=
0.525E(i +g)where g is the growth of earnings between the two years.
If g is 0.05, the value of the vested benefits rises by about 16 percent
ofthe wage. Thus, the wage should rebound between the tenth and
eleventhyearby about 16 percent plus the growth of productivity.
2 Recall that20years of service implies an annuity of 0.140 E and that
eachdollar of annuity has a presentvalueof $9.76asof its starting date.
This nominal amount is then discounted for one year at 6percent.
3On this see Medoff and Abrams (1978). More generally, see Hall(1980)for
a discussion of the view thatwagepayments over the worker's lifetime are
notrelated to annual productivity. This view implies that the value of
corporate equity depends on the age structure of the labor force, retirement
practices, age—earnings profiles, etc.l14 —
Ifthe Bulow compensating—wage conditions are not satisfied, the
legally vested benefits will understate the actuarial value of future benefits
in excess of the value of labor services. The potential benefits of the worker
with 9 years of experience should not be ignored and at least some fraction of
the expected increased benefit of the older worker should be taken into account.
A complete and accurate examination of future pension benefits should in
principle be based on estimates of compensating wage changes as well as the
accrual of vested benefit rights.
Extending the analysis from vested pensions to include a portion of
actuarially expected benefits makes the value of the firm's pension obligations
depend on the future level of prices. Because pension benefits are based on
earnings, particularly earnings during the immediate preretirement years, the
nominal value of the pension tends to vary in proportion to the price level
at the time of retirement, i.e., the real value of an individual's pension
is independent of the price level when he retires. Moreover, since
postretirenient pension benefits are generally not indexed,- the real value of
the pension varies inversely with the rate of inflation during the retirement
period. All of this can be reflected in the pension valuation by correctly
forecasting nominal benefits and using the corresponding nominal rates of
return or by forecasting real benefits and using the real rates of return.
Some firms make voluntary increases in the pension benefits of retirees
but these increases are significantly less than full indexing.—15—
But even a correct treatment of future inflation does not eliminate
the uncertainty involved in the calculation of future pension obligations. The
real pension benefits in future years are uncertain because real postretirement
benefits depend on inflation. The size of the currently unvested pension
benefits depends also on uncertain turnover rates and rates of relativewage
growth. Moreover, the real yield on the pension fund is uncertain and 'would
be so even if the price level were stable. The common procedure of using the
expected (mean) return to discount future benefits would not be appropriate
even if the firm were risk—neutral because the mean of the accumulated asset
values at different rates of return is not the same as the accumulated value
at the mean return.1 The correct procedure (for a risk—neutral firm) is to
calculate for each future date the expected value of the net contributions
that would be required at different rates of return and then discount these
amounts at a risk—free borrowing rate for bonds of that maturity.2
A quite different aspect of pension uncertainty is the possibility
of the failure of the pension plan or bankruptcy of thecompany. Under such
circumstances, the benefit obligations become the responsibility of the
federally—financed Pension Benefits Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) which has
recourse to the firm only to the extent of 30 percent of its equity. The
1 One dollar invested at 10percent for 10 years becomes $2.59. The expected
accumulated value if there is an even chance of a zero return and a 10
percent return is therefore (1.00 +2.59)12=1.80.In contrast, the
accumulated value at the expected yield of 5 percent is $1.63.
2 Thisassumes that the future contributions will be made with certainty.—16—
conventionalmeasure of the unfunded pension obligation ignores this re—
insurance feature and, to thatextent,overstates the expected liability
of the equity owners of the firm.1
On balance, it is not possible to say whether the conventional measure
of pension fund liability underestimates or overestimates the corresponding
true value. In considering the effect of unfunded pension obligations on
share prices and on shareholder saving, it is therefore important to recognize
that shareholders do not have either an accurate published estimate or the
detailedinformation with which to make the calculation for themselves.
Moreover, since the unfunded vested pension liability that firms publish 2
isthe difference between the total liability and the total assets, relatively
small differences in the estimate of the total liability imply much larger
proportional estimates of the net unfunded liability. Nevertheless, the
published estimate of the unfunded vested pension liability is the only
information on which shareholders could base their estimate and it is therefore
of interest to examine the effect on the share price of the obligation measured
in this way.3
This aspect of pension valuation is stressed by Treynor et. al. (1976) and
Gersovitz (1980).
2 Firms are currently required to publish only the unfunded obligation. Some
firms also provide information on their pension assets and therefore on
their total liability.
3 The estimates presented in this paper refer to share prices in 1976 and
1977. More recently, investors have had access to more detailed information
about pension calculations that are filed with the Department of Labor
pursuant to ERISA requirements. It would be of interest to repeat the
present analysis for a later year in order to investigate whether these
data influenced shareholder evaluation of the pension liabilities.—17-.
2. Specification of Market ValueEquations
We have estimated the impact of unfundedvested pension liabilities
on the market value of companies byanalyzing data for a large sample of
manufacturing firms for 1976 and 1977, the firstyears for which inflation—
adjusted income statements and balance sheetsare available. Our basic data
include information on: the replacementcost of plant, equipment and
inventories; the market value of corporateequity and debt;1 accounting
earnings with depreciation and inventory gainsadjusted for inflation; and
the reported values of pension liabilitiesand assets. The data are derived
primarilyfrom the Standard and Poors Compustat fileand augmented with other
information described below.
2.1Total Market Value
The general specification of the marketvaluationequationcombines
the capital valuation and earningsvaluation approaches. We thus buildon
earlier work by Gordon (1962), Modiglianiand Miller (1958), Oldfield (1977),
Tobin and Brainard (1977), and others.2The starting point of the specification
is the view that the total market value
of the corporation (including the
value of both debt and equity) isproportional to the replacement value of
the underlying assets: V=qA.3
1 The methodofestimating the market value of the corporation's debtis describedbelow.
2
Of these, only Oldfield specifically examines the effect of private
pensions. His model is based on a netearnings evaluation model of the
equity value of the firm. His estimates were for1971, before data on
inflation—adjusted accounts became available.
3Precisedefinitions of the variables arepresented in the next section.—18—
Althoughthe marginal value of q would be equal to one in equilibrium
under certain conditions,1 the average value of q will depend also on the firmts
abilityto provide above—average earnings. This stream of future earnings
reflects such things asmarket position, patents and other know—how, etc. The
equationsin this paper represent future earnings bythree variables: (1) the
currentratio of earnings to physical assets, E/A, where E includes interest
payments as well as equity profits; (2) the growth of profits over the past
decade, GRO1; and (3)therelative expenditure on research and development as




Where Erepresentsa random error.
The value of q may depend also on the perceived riskiness of the
firm. Since all of the firms in the present study are relatively large manu-
facturing firms, the variation in risk is more limited than it would be in a
fully representative sample of firms. Two measures of risk are added to the
specification of equation 24:a beta coefficient and a measure of corporate
leverage. A variety of different beta coefficients are conceptually possible,
differingin the portfolio of assets with respect to which the beta is
calculated and in the time interval used to define the regression (daily,
monthly,etc.). The current study uses a widely available equity market beta
1 If retained earnings are part of the marginal source of finance, the tax
system may make even the marginal value of q not equal to one; see
footnote 1 page 6.—19—
based on monthly values that is calculated by Merrill, Lynch,Pierce, Fenner
and Smith.1 Although corporate leverage would have no effect on the firm's
market value under the strict conditions specified by Modigliani and Miller
a higher ratio of debt to total capital could increase the market value of the
firm because of tax advantages or reduce it by increasing the risk of
bankruptcy or by limiting the investment activities of the firm.2 The expanded
specification is thus
(5)!. = cto +al.+ct2GROW +(j3 RD+ BETA+ DEBT+ A A A A
where DEBT is the market value of the firm's net debt.
We come finally to the value of pension obligations. If the unfunded
vested pension liabilities were accurately measured, they would beequivalent
to an equal value of debt or a corresponding reduction in the firm's netequity
value. In this case, the unfunded vested pension liability (UVPL) could be
added to the other components of the firm's market valueor, equivalently,
it would appear on the right hand side of equation 5 witha coefficient of
minus one. Thus 5wouldbecome
(6) V- cc +al+c2GROW+a3.2. + BETA+a5 DEBT+ci6 + A A A A
with c6equalto minusone. More generally, as we emphasized in Section 1,
there are errors in the measurement of unfunded pension liabilities that make
1 The beta values used in thecurrent study are reported in Merrill, Lynch
Pierce, Fenner and Smith (1976).
2 On the substantial costs ofbankruptcy, see the useful and extensive
discussion in Gordon and Flkiel (1979). Meyers ( ) discusses the way
in which debt may limit the firms activities. There is of course thepossibil-
ity firms differ in their optimal debt—equity ratios and that firms have cho-
sen their ratios to maximize V, thus making the least squares estimates of
equation 6 an inadequate way of estimating the effect of exogeneous changes in
debt.—20—
it inappropriate to specify a priori how the market is likely to respond to this
variable.
For many firms, it is also possible to estimate the value of the
assets held by the pension fund. The unfunded vested pension liabilities
can therefore be decomposed into the difference between total vested pension
liabilities (vPL) and pension assets (PA), i.e., UVPL =VPL—PA.The market
might consider the vested pension liabilities to be mismeasured and might
therefore value VPL at a more or less than dollar—for—dollar rate. But if the
market value of pension assets were known with certainty, the market might
value these assets dollar—for—dollar. This suggests including VPL and PA as
separate regressors and testing whether the coefficient of PA is one.
There are, however, two problems with this procedure. First, the
information on pension assets is available only with a substantial lag and is
subject to serious ambiguities and measurement problems.1 Second, investors may
regard information about pension assets as an indication of the likely magnitude
of vested liabilities or of some other unobserved attribute of the firm (e.g.
the ease with which it can raise funds or the management's expectations about
future growth).2 The PA variable is included separately in some of the
regression equations reported below to eliminate the restrictions that VPL and
1 These data are published in annual volumes of the Money Market Directory.
2 In the extreme, investors might regard the official estimates of vested
liabilities to contain no information about true liabilities while
believing that the firm's pension assets were some fraction of true
liabilities. In this case the coefficient of the PA variable would be
negative and the coefficient of the VPL variable would not be significantly
different from zero. By a similar argument, investors may regard the
reported level of UVPIJ as an indication of some other unobserved charac-
teristic of the firm and, to that extent, the effect on share—prices of
reported differences in UVPL cannot be regarded as an indication of the
effect of a general change in funding policy or of the current existence of
unfunded liabilities as such.—21—
PAhave equal and opposite coefficients buta theory of rational market
valuation cannot be tested with these coefficients.
For some firms, it is also possible toobtain information on what
are known as unfunded past and prior servicepension liabilities (UPPsL).1
Unlike the regular vested benefitliabilities, the past and prior service
liabilities represent a projection rather thana current legal liability.
More specifically, the past and prior serviceliability at any time is the
present value of all projected benefits minus thepresent value of the future
contributionsthat would be made under a normal scheduleof funding. This
difference reflects the funds that wouldalready have accumulated if the future
projected benefits were being funded Continuouslyon a normal schedule of fund-.
ing.2The difference between this past andprior service liability and total
pension assets represents the unfunded past andprior service liability.
Although firms are required to provide informationabout their
unfunded vested pension liabilities,providing information about past and prior
service liabilities is optional. For thelarge manufacturing firms that did
provide this information, the value of unfundedpast and prior liabilities
substantially exceeds the value of unfunded vestedpension liabilities. We have
therefore limited the sample to the firms thatprovided this additional infor-
mation. Unfortunately, there are widediscrepancies in the way that these
liabilities are defined and market
participants might rightly give much less
weight to these estimates than to the measure ofvested liabilities. Separate
equations are therefore estimated with and withoutthis variable.
This is also sometimes called the unfundedaccrued pension liability.
2 Thepast and prior service liability thus includes vestedas well as
unvested benefits.—22—
2.2 Equity Value
Our discussion until now has been about the totalmarket value of the
firm, including both the equity and debt components.It is interesting also to
examinethe market value of the firm' scommon stock equity and thewayinwhich
itis influenced bypension liabilities. The distinctionbetween the total
market value approach and the equity value approachcould be important if,
primarily because of tax or risk factors, itis inappropriate to assume the
same q value for debt and equity.
An alternativeto the total market valuation model relates the
valueof common stock equity (yE) to the net equity assets, i.e.,the replacement
value of the firm's physical assets minus the marketvalue of the debt and
the market value of the preferred stock (PS): i.e.,VE =qe(A—DEBT—PS).
Proceeding as before, the asset valuation ratio qewill depend on the firm's
future equity earnings. We define the firm'scurrent equity earnings (EE) as
total after—tax earnings (E) minus interest paymentsand preferred dividends
plus the gain that equity owners makeat the expense of their creditors because
of inflation; i.e., equity earnings are defined bysubtracting real interest
payments and preferred dividends fromthe total after—tax earnings that were
used for the total market value equation. The ten—yeargrowth of equity
earnings (GROWE) and the expenditure onresearch and development are also
included to represent the relation between currentand future earnings. The
specificationalso includes the market beta coefficient and a measureof
leverage.—23—
A correctly measured value of unfundedpension liabilities should
reduce the net equity value dollar—for_dollar.Again, the measurement problems
imply that a coefficent of unity on the actual UVPLvariable is not a
requirement for rational share valuation.
The complete specification of theequity value equation is thus:
(i)! = 80+81.+ 82GROWE +3RP ÷ BETA +85 DEBT+86 UVPL+C AE AE AE AE AE
when AE =A—DEBT—PS,the net asset value of the corporation'sequity.
Other specifications with pension assetsand past and prior service liabilities
are also estimated.
These specifications make no explicitallowance for the role of the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC),a government agency that reinsures
pension obligations.1 Gersovitz (1980) hasemphasized the role of the PBGC and
suggested that a marginal dollar of unfunded pensionliability should not
depress the firm's equity value to the same extent (ifat all) when the total
liability exceeds 30 percent of the firm's currentequity value. However, the
relevant effect of the PBGC does notdepend on the current ratio of benefits to
market value but on the possiblity that the firmmight at any time be in a posi-
tion where the 30 percent reinsurance limitwould come into effect. All things
equal, a higher ratio of UVPL to equity capital wouldinvolve a smaller marginal
effect of UVPL on the firm's equity value.Although this could in principle be
1 Under currentlaw, a corporation is responsible for its unfundedpension
liabilities only to the extent of 30percent of its equity value; any ftrther
obligation is met by the BGC.approximated by extending the specification of equation 1 to include a
quadratic term in the ratio of UVPL to net equity capital, the inadequacies
of the data suggest that such an estimate might be attempting to learn too
much from the data. Some estimates of this effect are presented in Section 5.
3. The Data
This section reviews the operational definitions of the variables
that are required to estimate equations 6 and 7 and then presents the means
and standard deviations of the variables for 1976 and 1971.
The construction of most of the variables uses the income statement,
balance sheet, and other data that are provided in the Standard and Poors
Compustat file. The market value of each firm's common stock (yE) is calculated
as the product of the number of shares outstanding and the market price per
shareon the last day of the year. Since price information is not provided
for the firm's preferred stock, the market value of the preferred stock (PS)
is estimated by dividing the annual preferred stock dividends by the Standard
and Poor preferred dividend yield for the current year.1 The market value of
the firm's debt (DEBT) is calculated by subtracting the firm's short—term
financial assets from the sum of short—term liabilities and an estimated value
oflong—term debt. The data provide information on the book value of long—term
debt and the amount of the annual interest payment. We assume that all
1 This ignores the role of convertible preferred stock. The assumed yields
for 1916and1977 were 7.66percent and 7.87 percent.—25—
long—termdebt has ten years until maturity and then calculate the present
value ofthe interest stream and final redemption, using the Baainterest rate.
Each firm's balance sheet provides information on the replacement
value of the firm's plant andequipment and the book valueof land. To tnis
we add the market value of the firm'sinventories.1 The sum is the real value
of the firm's capital stock, A.2
Total earnings (E) are the sum of :(1)the net profits available
for common stockholders as reported in the firm's accounts,(2) the value of
preferred dividends, (3) the interest payments,(ii)thedifference between
accounting depreciation arid depreciation at replacement cost,and (5) the
difference between LIFO inventory gains and FIFO inventory gainsfor those
firms that report on a FIFO basis. Total earnings are thus equivalentto the
real return to debt and equity capital.
Although the growth of earnings variable (GROW) should measurethe
increase in real earnings, neither we nor the market participantsbad accurate
information about inflation—adjusted earnings for years before1976. The earn-
ings growth variable therefore must be constructed intermsof conventional
earnings.3 More specifically, we define GROW as the difference between the
average accounting earnings (includinginterest) in the most recent five years
and the average earnings in the previous five years, divided bythe current capi-
tal stock (A).
1 For LIFO firms, the accounting formulas are meaningless and inventory value
is estimated by using data on the replacement cost ofinventories.
2 The value of A thus excludes intangible assets like patents, brand—loyalty,
etc. If this measurement error is correlated with theother variables it
will bias the coefficients.
3 Investors might, of course, have made their own approximate corrections
for the difference between real and nominal earnings.—26—
The remaining variables in thetotal market value equation have
already been described.1 The
corresponding variables for the equity value
equation are similar except that
they are divided by the value ofproperty,
plant and equipment minus themarket value of the firm's net debtand preferred
shares (AE). The equity
earnings variable (EE) has already beendefined as the
difference between totalearnings and the real interestpayments on the firm's
debt. The growth of equityearnings (GROwE) is the ten—year differencein
accounting after—tax equity earnings (thesum of dividends and retainedearnings
as conventionally defined) dividedby the value of equity assets (AE).
The sample of firms for each ofthe two years (1976 and 1977)consists
of all those manufacturing firms
in the Compustat file for whichthe required
information was provided about
inflation_ad.justed accounts and aboutpension
liabilities and assets. The
inflation_adjusted accounts were requiredby
the Securities Exchange Commissiononly for firms above a certain size.Since
Standard and Poors only includedthis information in the Colnpustatfile if it
was reported by a certain date,
reporting delays further limited the number
of firms for which such information
is available. Although the valueof un-
funded vested pension obligationsmust be reported on each firms 10—Kform,
the information about past serviceliabilities and about the value ofpension
assets is provided at the firm's discretion.
Restricting our sample to firms
that provided all of this information
significantly limited the size of the
sample. The resulting samples contained117 firms for 1976 and 193 firms for
1977.
These are research and development
(RD/A), the Merrill—Lynch betacoefficent (BETA), the market value of net debt(DEBT), and the three pensionvariables (UVPL/A, IJPPSL/A, and PA/A).—27—
Table 1 presents the mean values and standarddeviations for the key
variables in 1976 and 1977. A few features deservecomment. Note first that
the mean values of q and qe (i.e, V/A andVE/AE) are both approximately one and
that for both years q exceeds qel The grossearnings after tax (EtA)
averaged 6 percent of the real capital whilethe corresponding net earnings
(EE/AE) averaged about 3 percent of equity capital in1976 and 1 percent in
1977.2
Unfunded vested pension liabilities (UVPL/A) averagedabout 5 percent
of assets. The gross pension assets of the firms wereabout 13 percent of the
corresponding physical assets, implying that(for this sample of firms) the
unfunded vested pensions averaged less than one—thirdof total vested pensions.
The unfunded past and prior service liabilities averageabout 10 percent of
assets and are therefore about twice as large asthe unfunded vested
liabilities. The ratio of total gross pension liabilitiesto corporate assets
is therefore about 25 percent.3
1 This inequality is consistent with the view that taxes cause the market
value of equity to be less than unity. See above,footnote 1 page 6.
2 These figures are consistent with the aggregate estimates for all non-
financial corporations reported in Feldstein and Suxnmers(1979) and
Feldstein and Poterba (1980).
3 This is the sum of pension assets (PA/A =0.135)and unfunded past and
prior service liabilities (UPPL/A =o.iio).Total pension liabilities
are thus about 1.8 times pension assets.If this ratio could be extrapolated
to all private pensions, it would imply that the$519 billion of private
pension assets reported in the flow offunds account for 1979 (excluding
the $68 billion assets of state and local pensionfunds) correspond
to a private pension "wealth" of employees of$988.2 billion. The









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thenet debt to capital ratios for both years are quite low, reflecting
the offsetting effects of trade credit and other nominal assets. There is very
substantial variation in the ratio among firms.
i. Parameter Estimates for the Total Market Value Equation
Theparameter estimates presented in this section indicate that unfunded
vested pension liabilities reduce the market value of firms. Although the
standarderrors of the coefficientsandthemeasurement problemsreferred to
earlier are too large to draw precise conclusions, the estimates are compatible
with the conclusion that eachdollar of unfunded vested pension liability re-
duces the firm's market value by one dollar. The specific point estimates suggest
a greater than one—for—one effect andgenerallydiffer in a statistically signif-
icantway from zero.
Table 2 presents estimates of three alternative specifications of
the total market value equation. Each specification is estimated for 1916 and
1917. The results are generally similar for the two years but differ in a
number of details. We begin by coxmnenting on the 1917 results since the
sample is much larger and likely to be more representative.
Before discussing the coefficents of the pension variables, it is
useful to examine briefly the coefficients of the other variables. The
coefficient of the earnings variable in equation 2.1 implies that an extra
dollar of after—tax earnings raises the market value of the firm by $5.23. It
isimportant to emphasize thatthis coefficient should not be misinterpreted


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































underlying specification is basically an asset valuation model,1 the coefficient
of the earnings variable indicates how the firm's q value is increased by a
higher current level of earnings.
The positive growth variable also has the expected sign, indicating
that finns that have experienced basic growth during the past decade have a
high market value. The positive coefficient on the research and development
variable indicates that firms that do more research are expected to have
relatively higher future earnings. It would, of course, be wrong to infer that
any firm could raise its market value by increasing its spending on research.
The market is presumably able to judge (even if imperfectly) between potentially
productive research and wasted research spending. The coefficient therefore
reflects the relation between the market's valuation of different companies and
the amount of their research spending rather than the market's valuation of
incremental research spending as such.
A higher ratio of debt to total capital reduces the market valuation
of the firm, presumably reflecting the increased risk of bankruptcy or the re-
strictions on the firm's activities that are implied by the debt service obliga-
tion. The beta coefficient does not have a statistically significant effect.
This may reflect the particular choice of beta coefficient variable1 or the
lack of a more complete specification of the firm's risk characteristics.
The coefficient of the unfunded vested pension liability variable is
—l.4 with a standard error of O.T. The point estimate implies that each
dollar of unfunded liability reduces the firm's value by $l.I&. Such an effect
1 See above,page18.—32—
would imply that the market regards the firms' reports as an understatement
of the true liability (for the types of reasons discussed in Section 1).
The standard error implies, however, that a two—thirds confidence interval
reaches from —1.03 to —1.91. The data are thus compatible with the possibility
of a one—for—one substitution as well as of a more substantial effect.
Equation 2.2 adds the value of pension assets to the set of explanatory
variables. The coefficients of all of the variables except the unfunded pension
liability variable remain almost exactly as in equation 2.1. The coefficient of
the unfunded liability variable shrinks (in absolute value) to —1.12 with a
standard error of 0.51. The pension asset variable itself has a coefficient of
—0.45 with a standard error of 0.28. These point estimates imply that each
dollar of reported pension assets increases the market value of the firm by
6T cents (i.e., the difference between 1.12 an 0.15) while each dollar of
reported liability decreases the value by $1.12. The standard error of 0.28
implies that the difference between these two effects is barely statistically
significant at the 10 percent level.
Equation 2.3 adds the value of the unfunded liabilities based on past
and prior service to the set of regressors. The estimated coefficient (0.38)
is smaller than its standard error (0.5k), implying that the market appears to
ignore unvested liabilities. Deleting the value of pension assets from this
equation only makes the coefficient of the past service liability smaller
(reducing it from 0.38 to 0.13).—33—
Theresults for 1976arequalitatively similar but some differences
should be noted. Although the coefficient of the earningsvariable is quite
similar in both years, the coefficients of the earnings growthvariable and the
research—and—development variable are both substantially largerin 1976.
The coefficient of the unfunded liability variable is absolutelylarger (—1.87)
but also has a larger standard error (0.79). The unfundedliability effect
therefore again differs in a statistically significant way from zerobut is com-
patible with minus one as well as with values that areabsolutely much larger.
When the value of pension assets is added to the set of regressors
(in equation 2.5), the value of its coefficient is very much lessthan its
standard error and the coefficients of the other variablesremain essentially
unchanged. The data thus imply that the market looks onlyat the net unfunded
liability and not at its components.
Finally, the unfunded past and prior service liabilityvariable in
equaton 2.6 is also smaller than its standard error,confirming the 1977
estimate that the market appears to ignore this variable andfocuses exclusively
on the vested liabilities.
5.ParameterEstimates for the Equity Value Equations
The parameter estimates for the equity value equations supportthe
conclusions of the total market value equations presented inthe previous
section. There are, however, some differences between the twosets of results
as well as between 1976 and 1977 that deservecomment.
All of the equations in Table 3showthat the market value of common...3 !_
stockper dollar of "equity capital"1 is positively related to current earnings,
the growth of earnings and the intensity of research effort. Thegrowth and
research effects are stronger in the 1976 equations. The beta coefficient is
again insignificant in both years.
The coefficient of the unfunded vested liability variable in
equation 3.1 equals —1.23 with a standard error of 0.iO. This is clearly
consistent with the view that the equity owners regard the stated value of
unfunded vested liabilities as the most likely value and reduce their demand
price (or offer price) for the stock by the stated value of the unfunded vested
liability.
When the value of pension assets is added as an additional variable in
equation 3.2, the other coefficents remain essentially unchanged. The co-
efficient of the pension assets variable is _0.140 with a standard error of
0.27. The point estimates imply that a dollar of pension assets adds only 58
centsto the equity value of the company, about half of the negative effect of
a dollar of pension liabilities. But the size of the standard error implies
that the difference between the pension asset effect and the pensionliability
effect is only statistically significant at about the 15 percent level. Con-
ventional tests of statistical significance imply that equation 3.2 does not
dominate equation 3.1.
The unfunded past and prior service liability has a small coefficent
(equation 3.3) that is only a small fraction of its standard error. Its intro-
duction raises the standard errors of the other coefficients, especially that of
Recall that equity capital (A) is defined as the difference between the real































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the unfunded vested pensions variable. But equation 3.3 is clearly not pre-
ferable to the specification of equation 3.1.
Equation 3.J4 introduces a second order term in the unfunded vested
pension liability variable. Its positive coefficient implies that the depressing
effect on equity value of an extra dollar of unfunded liability decreases as
the relative size of the unfunded liability increases. This is consistent with
the role of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation in limiting the corporate
pension obligation to no more than 30 percent of the firm's equity value.1
The point estimates of the two pension coefficients (—2.63 for the linear
term and 5.01 for the quadratic term) imply very substantial effects of unfunded
liabilities on share prices at all relevant levels of the UVPL variable. At
its mean value (0.0l9), the effect of a further increase in UVPL is —2.63 +
2(5.01) (0.019) =_2.111.At one standard deviation above the mean value of tJVPL
(i.e. at UVPL =0.107),the effect of a further increase in UVPL is still
—1.53.Althoughthe substantial standard error indicates that these point
estimatesare subject to a sizable margin of error, the results clearly
confirm the implication of equation 3.1 thatunfundedvested pension liabilities
significantlydepress the equity value of the firm.2
The results for 1976 are similar but not identical. The earnings
growth and research variables bad a more powerful effect on equity value in
1 Very few firms currently have unfunded vested liabilities in excess of 30
percent of the firm's equity value (only 8 ofthe 193sample firms in 1977
and 5 of the 117 sample firms in 1976).
2 Adding the value of pension assets or the unfunded past and service liabili-
ties does not alter the other coefficients in the equation. Neither of these
coefficients is itself significantly different from zero.—37—
the 1976 equation. The leverae variable is again negative and its effect is
stronger for 1976 than for 1977. The unfunded vested liability variable in
equation 3.5 has a coefficent of _i.814 and a standard error of 0.69. The
coefficient is thus different from zero at any conventional significance level.
The pension assets variable is included in the next three equations
where it has a coefficient of about 0.30 and smaller than its 0.75 standard
error.
Equations 3.7 and 3.8 show that neither the unfunded past and prior
service liabilities nor the coefficients of the quadratic term in vested liabil-
ities is statistically significant. Including these variables has very little
effect on the other coefficients.
Some Implications
Although the problems of statistical measurement imply that the para-
meter estimates must be treated with caution, the current finding that
unfunded vested pension liabilities cause an approximately equal reduction in
the market value of the firm, if supported by future research, has important
implications about the relation between private pensions and national saving,
about the poor performance of the stock market in recent years, and about
optimal corporate financial policy. This final section considers each of these.
6.1 Private Pensions and National Saving
The most important implication of the share price response is that the
existence of unfunded private pension liabilities does not necessarily entail
a reduction in total private saving. Because the pension liability reduces
the equity value of the firm, shareholders are given notice of its existence
and an incentive to save more themselves. For this reason, unfunded private—38—
pensions differ fundamentally from the unfundedSocialSecurity pension and
the other unfunded federal government civilian and military pensions.
The net effect of private pensions on total private saving also
depends on a number of other factors. How well do the firms' vested pension
liabilities correspond to what the employees perceive as their accrued pension
wealth? How does this accrued pension wealth or other aspects of anticipated
pensionbenefits influence direct saving by employees? And how does the time
pattern of increased shareholder (and corporate) saving compare to the time pat-
tern of reduction in employee saving?
Although there has been some work on the second of these questions,
the analyses were forced to use quite inadequate data. On balance, the
evidence indicates that anticipated benefits reduce individual saving but the
link between vested pension liabilities and perceived benefits remains complete-
ly unexplored. The availability of improved data should make it possible to
pursue these questions more effectively in the coming years.
6.2 The Level of Share Prices
The poor performance of the stock market has been one of the most
striking economic facts of the 1970's. The Standard and Poor composite index of
common stock prices fell 147 percent in real terms between 1969 and 1979. A
number of explanations of this dramatic decline have been offered and there may
well be some truth in all of them: Feldstein (1980a, 1980b) has emphasized the
interaction of inflation and tax rules; Malkiel (1977) has emphasized increasing
risk; and Modigliani and Cohn (1979) have emphasized the investors' failure to
distinguish correctly between nominal and real yields.—39—
The growth of unfunded pension liabilities is another contributor to
the poor performance of share prices. The evidence for the current sample of
firms implies that the unfunded vested pension liabilities were seven percent
of the market value of the firms' equities in 1977. If the equity value of the
firm is reduced dollar—for—dollar by its unfunded liability, the recognition of
these liabilities has lowered the average share value by about seven percent.1
6.3 The Pension Funding Puzzle
InSection 1, we noted thatit should be optimal for firms to fund
theirvestedpension obligations as quickly as possible. A firm that borrows
and invests the proceeds in the pension fund has theadvantage of earning tax
exempt interest (on the assets in the pension fund) while paying tax deductible
interest on the borrowed money used to finance the pension fund. It is a
puzzle therefore that all firms do not fund their vested obligations fully
and that an average of about 25 percent of the vested liabilities in the sample
firms were unfunded.
One potential explanation of such apparently irrational behavior by
firms is that they believe that the securities market is irrational: i.e., that
investors would recognize debt that appears on the balance sheet but not the
1 There are severalreasons to believe that the corresponding effect of pensions
on share prices at the end of the 1960's was either very small or non-
existent. First, without the ERISA rules the future benefits were not as
strong a binding obligation. Second, although the extent of the unfunded
vested liability at that time cannot be estimated, it is noteworthy that the
ratio of pension fund reserves to corporate equity has more then doubled in
the 1970's. Finally, investors have undoubtedly become much more aware of
private pension obligations because of the attention focused by ERISA and
because of the growth of these liabilities. In addition to the reduced value
of V/A caused by the UVPL, the substitution of pension promises for current
wages causes earnings to be overstated; to the extent that the market
recognizes this, the price—earnings ratio will be reduced. Note that this
price—earnings effect would be present even for a firm that just begins to
substitute pension promises for wages while the effect of UVPL would persist
for a firm that stops using unfunded liabilities..J40—
unfundedpension liabilities. If that were true, it would be in the interest
of current shareholders to leave the pension liability unfunded. However, the
evidence in this paper indicates that securities investors do not make this
type of mistake.
Whythendo firms not fund their pension obligations more completely?
It is, of course, possible that some firms do not understand the advantage of
funding or that they believe (contrary to the evidence in this paper) that
the securities market is irrational in valuing unfunded pension obligations.
Alternatively,some firms maynot be more completely funded because they are
already contributing the niaximuin annual tax deductible amount. Firms may also
be reluctant to fund more rapidly because the pension contribution would reduce
the year's reported earnings (even if financed by borrowing) which in turn would
reduce the firm's market value.1 Finally, the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation may encourage firms to remain less than fully funded in order to
take potential advantage of the insurance protection that it gives. Because of
the substantial importance of pension assets and the potential interest in
changing the pension funding options available to firms, a more thorough
understanding of firms' current funding behavior would clearly be desirable.
1 It is not clear whether the market is irrational in this 'way. Investors can
in principle correct annual earnings by the change in the vested pension
obligations but we know of no evidence that this is done by securities ana-
lysts. But even if investors now have too little information to distinguish
between expenditures on pension contributions and accruals of pension
liabilities, a firm should be able to provide such information to share-
holders if it wanted to undertake an accelerated funding of pension liabili-
ties.—la-
The conclusions of this paper reflect the experience of manufacturing
firms in 1976 and 1977. The equations developed here should be reestimated with
data for more recent years and for a wider range of firms. The growing availa-
bility of a richer array of data on firms' pension rules, employee coverage, and
pension fund assets will not only make possible new analytic studies but will
also permit securities analysts to reflect the value of unfunded pension obliga-
tions more accurately. This in turn will strengthen the ability of unfunded as
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